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CASES NOTED
ADMIRALTY
MARITIME LIEN California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 38 U.S.L.W.
2367 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1969).After the defendant vessel discharged
bunker oil into navigable California ocean waters, the state instituted an
in rem action against the vessel for damages resulting from the harm to its
water and marine life. The district court determined that the cause of action constituted a tort that gave rise to a maritime lien on the vessel. The
court reasoned that although this was not an ordinary maritime tort involving accident or personal injury, there could be no logical distinction between existing common law actions for damage to a ship or person and the
instant injury to the water itself. In fact since liability of vessel owners
traditionally is limited to their interest in the vessels, there are strong reasons for allowing the injured a maritime lien on that property. By allowing
a lien the court has created a small deterrent to future torts of this nature at
a time when the destruction recently caused by marine oil spills indicates a
need for much more stringent deterrent-remedies.
TORT -

ANTITRUST

CONGLOMERATE MERGER Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969).AllisChalmers (Allis), threatened by White Consolidated's purchase of 31.2 percent of its outstanding stock, sought injunctive relief in the district court to
restrain White from effecting a complete takeover. Allis alleged that the
proposed merger, if allowed, would result in product extension (the effects
of which would eliminate Allis as a potential competitor) and be conducive
to reciprocal dealing in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1964). The district court denied the injunction, holding that Allis
had failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of success upon a final
hearing. The court of appeals, citing FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568 (1967), reversed and granted a preliminary injunction.
For the first time in any action where the legality of the conglomerate
merger has been challenged under Clayton 7, a court discussed each of the
anticompetitive effects which may ensue from such a combination. The
court's limited analysis of the anticompetitive issues, however, adds little to
the development of legal standards to appraise the conglomerate merger
and applies a rationale whereby any person seeking to enjoin a merger
involving large firms in a diversified industry may succeed with little difficulty.
CLAYTON 7 -

CIVIL RIGHTS

Westberry v. Fisher,38 U.S.L.W.
2426 (D. Me. 1970).In Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109 (D.
Me. 1969), Maine's regulations limiting the amount of benefits a family
could receive under the state's Aid to Families With Dependent Children
program were decared unconstitutional. The families involved in that action then brought suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964), seeking damages from the state officials who administered
the unconstitutional regulations. Recovery was sought against the defendDAMAGES -

ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS -
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ants both personally and in their official capacities. The district court denied
personal relief, holding that "good faith" was a valid defense in a section
1983 action. Further, because any recovery against the defendants in their
official capacities would be paid out of public funds, the action was, in
reality, a suit against the state. The court, therefore, dismissed it for lack
of jurisdiction, holding that a state is not a "person" for purposes of section
1983, and that the suit was barred by the l1th amendment.
The court's recognition of a "good faith" defense in this case was a
logical extension of the Supreme Court's holding in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967), which made "good faith and probable cause" an available
defense to police officers in a section 1983 action. The administration of
state welfare programs would be an impossibility if the officials in charge
were required to determine the constitutionality of each regulation before
acting, with the consequence of personal liability if the courts should reach
a different conclusion.
N.AEs - THE RIGHT TO CHANGE, Application of Middleton, 60 Misc.
2d 1056, 304 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969).- Robert Lee Middleton, an American-born citizen, intended to instruct the world as to the attitudes and behavioristic patterns of the African people. As a student of
Africa and its culture, he thought it fitting to have a name based on its"
heritage. Under N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 60 (McKinney 1948), he applied for leave to change his name to Kikuga Nairobi Kikugus. Noting that
Robert Lee Middleton is a fine American name, the court denied petitioner's
application, holding that to permit this name change would mislead those
he would instruct. Although section 60 may give the court the power to
deny name changes which it feels will defraud or deceive the public, this
statutory authority does not override the common law doctrine that one legally acquires the name he uses. To the rest of the world he may be Kikuga
Nairobi Kikugus, but in New York he is still Robert Lee Middleton.
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW

DuE PROCESS - NOTICE AND HEARING - .McConaghley v. New York, 60
Misc. 2d 825, N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969).- Because of her
confusion and apparent inablility to care for herself, plaintiff was transferred by New York City's Welfare Department to the Psychiatric Division
of Bellvue Hospital, from which she was discharged after 2 weeks observation. The hospital, acting pursuant to General Order No. 681 of the Department of Hospitals, retained $442 of the money found in her possession
as payment for her maintenance and care. The Civil Court of New York
ordered repayment, however, analogizing General Order No. 681 to the
Wisconsin statute struck down in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969), wherein it was held that garnishment of a debtors wages
without notice or hearing violates the due process clause of the 14th amendment.
In Sniadach, the special hardships brought about by garnishment without prior hearing prompted the Court to carve out an exception to the
general law of attachment. Although the New York court appears to have
extended this exception, General Order No. 681, since it provided for
neither prior nor subsequent hearing, fell directly within the language of
Sniadach.
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CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969).Reversing the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan
speaker, the Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion struck down Ohio's
Criminal Syndicalism Statute, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Page
1953), on the ground that it defined the crime "in terms of mere advocacy
not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action." In ruling
that the statute was a violation of the first and 14th amendments, the Court
specifically overruled its holding in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927).
The decision portends that similar state statutes will now be ruled unconstitutional where they make advocacy alone sufficient for conviction.
The real import of this decision, however, may be its impact upon the similarly worded Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964), which was used throughout the 1950's to convict Communists and Communist sympathizers.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH -

People v. Fowler,
PREINDICTMENT LINEUPS Cal. 2d , 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969).Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and committed to the California
Youth Authority after he had been positively identified at a preindictment
lineup by the two complaining witnesses. At the lineup defendant was
neither represented by counsel nor was he told that counsel would be appointed for him if he so desired. In reversing the judgment of commitment,
the Supreme Court of California held that, unless there is an intelligent
waiver, the presence of counsel is necessary at a preindictment lineup to
preserve one's right to a fair trial and to ensure reliability of witnesses' testimony. The court also noted that admission of evidence of the lineup was
error which could not be cured by subsequent in-court identification by a
source independent of the lineup. The opinion drew upon the principles
enunciated in United States v. vade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), which guaranteed the right to counsel at
post-indictment lineups unless local regulations are protective enough to withdraw the lineup as a "critical stage" in the proceedings. In this case the
local police regulations, promulgated after Wade and Gilbert, provided only
that counsel would be present at lineups when the person "has" an attorney.
The court emphasized that it did not intend to extend the rules of Wade and
Gilbert to all pretrial confrontations, but only to those where the facts and
circumstances indicate that the presence of counsel is "necessary."
RIGHT TO COUNSEL -

-

COURTS
APPELLATE JURISDICTION -

MAYOR'S COURT NOT COURT OF RECORD -

Greenhills v. Miller, 20 Ohio App. 2d 313, 253 N.E.2d 311 (1969).Appellant was convicted in mayor's court of violating a municipal ordinance,
and he appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals. The court held that because OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(b) (2) limits its appellate jurisdiction to
hearing appeals from final judgments of inferior courts of record and because in Ohio a mayor's court is not a court of record, it could not hear the
appeal. In what may have been an attempt to elicit legislative response, the
court noted that because a 1968 state constitutional amendment eliminated
the other avenue of appeal from a mayor's court - the court of common
pleas - the defendants were effectively denied any right to appeal within
the state court system.
Thus, in Ohio, the only possibility of review from a mayor's court may
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be to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964), for
the Court has not heretofore declared that a state must guarantee a defendant
the right to appeal.
RULES OF COURT AND CONDUCT OF BUSINESS - POWER TO REGULATE
PROCEDURE - Peck v. Stone, Misc. 2d, N.E.2d - , 304

N.Y.S.2d 881 (App. Div. 1969).
When petitioner, a young female attorney, wore a mini-skirt during an in-court appearance the respondent
judge issued an order prohibiting her from reappearing until her attire
was "suitable, conventional, and appropriate." On appeal from Special
Term's refusal to vacate the order, the Appellate Division held that the
order was an abuse of discretion absent a showing that the attorney's appearance created a distraction or disrupted orderly court processes. While agreeing that membership in the bar imposes conditions and at the same time
grants privileges, the court noted that any judicially imposed condition must
bear a reasonable relation to the end served.
Ordinarily, an allegation of arbitrariness and caprice must be proven by
the party attacking such an order, but here the defendant judge was required
and failed - to show that the "long-skirt" rule was necessary to preserve courtroom decorum. Thus, it would seem the power of a judge to
control the personal appearance of court officers has been curtailed, and
fashion is alive and well in the courtrooms of New York.
CRIMINAL LAW
IN GENERAL United States v. Lucia, 416
F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1969).- Lucia was convicted for violating the federal
statutes taxing illegal wagers, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401, 4403, 7201 (1964), because he failed to file the required tax return, to keep the required records,
and to report other aspects of his wagering. Lucia moved to set aside the
judgment and sentences, basing his motion on Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968), wherein the Court held that a defendant's assertion of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a bar to prosecution for nonpayment of the federal wagering tax.
The Fifth Circuit examined each element of the tripartite retroactivity
test enunciated in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), and concluded that
the dominant element, the Court's "purpose" in establishing the Marchetti
rule, dictated that untoward effects of convictions for wagering tax violations
could and should be eliminated by Marchetti's retroactive application. This
case is in direct conflict with Graham v. United States, 407 F.2d 1313 (6th
Cir. 1969), which held Marchetti prospective. Therefore, Supreme Court
review of the issue is likely.
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEAS -

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS -

RIGHT TO DISSEMINATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

Bradesku v. Antion, 21 Ohio App. 2d 67, 255 N.E.2d 265 (1970)After his second wife sued for divorce, plaintiff brought suit for alienation
of affection against the Radio Church of God, claiming that the church
disrupted his home by preaching the fundamentalist doctrine that a divorced
man commits adultery by remarrying. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed
by the court of appeals, which followed the general rule requiring wrongful
conduct by the defendant to be the cause of the alienation of affection.
-
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Since the defendant's conduct was well within the constitutionally protected areas of religion and speech and consequently not wrongful, the
decision merely reinforces the traditional judicial resistance to curtailment of
first amendment rights, but does so within a unique factual context.
HOUSING LAW

STANDING TO SUE -

SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP - South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 38 U.S.L.W. 2413 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 1969),

cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. April 6, 1970).An historical association and a neighborhood group petitioned the district court to enjoin
a federally financed, urban renewal agency from demolishing several historic
buildings in Lexington, Kentucky, which were supposed to be given special
protection by virtue of being on the National Register [see 16 U.S.C. § 470
(Supp. II, 1966)1. The plaintiffs claimed that the agency had not afforded
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation an opportunity to make recommendations regarding the disposition of the buildings, as required by
section 470f. However, the court of appeals held that the associations lacked
standing to sue, both because they did not have a personal stake in the litigation and because they did not qualify under the "private attorney general"
doctrine as recently interpreted in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.

FPC, 354 F.2d 608( 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), and
Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
In the instant opinion, the Sixth Circuit seems to have sacrificed sound
legal analysis for verbal brevity. The Scenic Hudson and Road Review
cases held that groups which could demonstrate that their special interests
coincided with those protected by federal statutes had standing to sue. It is
arguable that the associations' raisons d'etre paralleled the federal statutory
policy of preserving historical landmarks and therefore should have provided a sufficient basis for standing. This decision represents a departure
from the more realistic position of the Second Circuit which recognized
that groups sensitive to infringements on particular facets of the national
interest can most appropriately intercede to protect that interest.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONTINENTAL SHELF United States v. Ray, 38
U.S.L.W. 2427 (5th Cir. Jan. 20, 1970).The United States sought to
enjoin two private groups from constructing settlements atop several submerged reefs located 41/2 miles southeast of the Florida coast. Rejecting the defendants' contention that these reefs were newly colonized island
nations, the court of appeals upheld the district court's injunction, holding
that the reefs were part of the seabed, and thus within the United States
jurisdiction under the Outer Continential Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS -

1332 (1964).

An island is a "naturally-formed area of land surrounded by water,
which is above the level of mean high water." United States v. California,
382 U.S. 448 (1966). However, as the Ray court recognized, artificial
islands, the seabed, and the subsoil come within the long-standing rule of
international law which allows a sovereign nation to explore, exploit, and/or
conserve the natural resources of the contiguous continental shelf. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1964); Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 13/38 (1958); Truman Proclamation of 1945, 10 Fed.
Reg. 12303 (1945). But for this principle, it is highly probable that the
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continental shelf would veritably bristle with "nations" dedicated to the
cultivation of various pleasurable pursuits.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

DUTY OF PROTECTION - Bass v. New York,
Misc. 2d.N.E.2d , 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969).Pursuant to N.Y. PUB. HOUSING LAw § 402 (McKinney 1957), the New
York Housing Authority provided a police force to protect its 10-building,
16-acre complex in which plaintiff's daughter was brutally murdered. In
the subsequent wrongful death action, plaintiff prevailed on the theory that
because the Housing Authority had assumed a duty of adequate protection
toward its tenants and was aware of the high crime rate in the project, its
negligence in providing needed protection substantially contributed to the
child's death.
This decision significantly broadens the responsibility of the municipality
qua landlord. Prior to Bass, a housing authority owed its tenants the same
duty as that of' a private landlord - maintenance of the facility - not
protection from criminal activity. Now, however, when the municipality
voluntarily assumes the affirmative duty of protecting its tenants, it must
perform that duty adequately.
LANDLORD AND TENANT -

PATENT LAw
SUBJECTS PATENTABLE

-

COMPUTER PROGRAMS -

In

re Prater, 415

F.2d 1393 (U.S.C.C.P.A. 1969).Appellants invented a method for
analyzing a mixture of gases which could be performed by a properly programed digital computer, and filed a patent application which was rejected
by both the Patent Office examiner and the Patent Office Board of Appeals.
The application's failure resulted from the Office's determination that the
claim stating the method of computer analysis was too broad in scope to
comply with the "specificity" requirement contained in 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1964). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed the action of
the Board and rejected the appellants' application.
The real significance of the case lies in the dictum which makes it dear
that the court is willing to allow patents to issue for computer programs
that are the subjects of properly drawn claims. This is a significant step
forward in patent law, which hitherto denied protection to the core of modern computer science - the program.
PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS
DAMAGES Jackson v. Anderson, 38 U.S.L.W. 2417 (Fla. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1970).- After the unplanned birth of their child, plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought a negligence and breach of warranty action against the physician who performed a
"sterilization" operation on the wife. The physician asserted that a cause
of action could be maintained only prior to the birth of the child, because
the allowance of damages for a normal birth was against public policy. The
Florida Court of Appeals, in holding that plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action, declared that recovery could be granted following, as well as before,
the child's birth.
Although courts have consistently denied recovery in similar situations
by accepting the argument that any normal birth was a "blessed event," the
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF WARRANTY -
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instant decision follows a trend initiated by Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), which held that in these circumstances public policy did not preclude the possibility of recovery after birth
of the child.
PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS
HOSPITAL

STAFF MEMBERSHIP

APPLICATIONS

-

JUDICIAL

REVIEW

-

Davidson v. Youngstown Hospital Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 250 N.E.
Appellants, licensed podiatrists, applied for hospital
2d 892 (1969).privileges and staff membership at a private, nonprofit hospital. Upon rejection by the hospital, they petitioned the trial court for an order compelling the hospital to approve their applications. The trial court denied relief,
reasoning that the decision by the appellee was not subject to judicial review.
Although it affirmed the denial of the mandatory order, the court of appeals
significantly overruled the lower court's rationale, noting that the judiciary
may grant equitable relief where a private hospital has unreasonably and
discriminatorily excluded medical practitioners from its staff. Since a hospital is primarily a servant of the public, the appellate tribunal concluded
that the discretionary powers with respect to staff membership were fiduciary in nature, to be exercised in trust for the benefit of the public.
This case places Ohio among the enlightened minority of jurisdictions
which allow judicial review of a private hospital's discretionary power to
pass on staff membership applications. By reviewing all the factors on
which the hospital made its decision, the court extended the holding of the
leading case, Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, 40 N.J. 389, 192, A.2d 817
(1963), which had held unreasonable a private hospital's refusal to even
consider a doctor's application.
SALES

Dudley v.
NECESSARIES AND FAMILY EXPENSES In a
Md. , 257 A.2d 437 (1969).Montgomery Ward & Co., merchant's action for the cost of goods purchased by defendant's wife after
she had committed adultery and voluntarily separated from him, Maryland's
highest court ordered summary judgment for the defendant, since he had
not consented to the purchases. The merchant's lack of knowledge of the
separation and the question of whether the goods were necessaries, the court
held to be irrelevant.
The decision affirms the established rule that a husband is not liable for
the necessaries of his separated wife, when such separation is the wife's
fault. It can be argued, however, that the rule has an unjustly harsh effect
upon merchants who generally lack personal knowledge of their customers'
current marital status. Since many states, by statute, have softened the effect
of the analogous common law rule which provided for immediate termination of an agent's authority upon the unknown death of the principal,
under the instant facts a similar modification seems in order.
HUSBAND AND WIFE -

SCHOOLS & SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Morrison v. State Board of EduREVOCATION OF LICENSE Cal. 2d , 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).cation, During a period of emotional strain, petitioner, a male school teacher, allegedly engaged in limited noncriminal homosexual acts with another

TEACHERS -
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teacher. Prior to -this, petitioner had never engaged in homosexual acts and
his record as a teacher was above reproach. Acting on a report filed by
the other teacher, the State Board of Education removed petitioner's life
teaching diploma under a state statute authorizing revocation of a teacher's
life diploma for immoral or unprofessional conduct and acts involving
moral turpitude., The superior court upheld the board, but the supreme
court reversed, restricting the meaning of "immoral conduct" to actions
which indicate that one is no longer qualified to perform the duties of a
teacher, and holding that absent evidence of such conduct petitioner was
still fit to teach.
By 'interpreting the statute in this manner, the court overruled precedent
and adopted the standards of interpretation set forth in the Ohio case,
jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233
N.E.2d 143 (1967), which held that only conduct hostile to the school
community can be considered "immoral."
SECURITIES REGULATION

SEcuRrEs ACT OF 1933 § 17(a) - PUNITIVE DAMAGES - Globus v.
Law Research Services, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969)As a result
of certain nondisclosures in the offering circular, under the implied civil
fraud action of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77q (1964), the lower court held the underwriter and president of the issuer liable for punitive damages. The Second Circuit reversed the award,
reasoning that punitive damages were not necessary for the effective enforcement of the Act.
A recent decision, deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647
(D. Colo. 1969), allowed punitive damages in an implied civil fraud action
under Rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1969), promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
In contrast, the Second Circuit has consistently interpreted the Securities
Exchange Act § 28(a) prohibition against recovery in excess of actual damages, as controlling both express and implied rights. E.g., Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
In disallowing punitive damages in the instant case, the court has continued
to construe the two acts in pari materia, demonstrating its belief that punitive damages are not apposite to implied rights under the federal securities
acts.
TAXATION
MUTUAL FUND SHARES - Davis v. United
States, 306 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1969).Decedent's shares in an
open-end mutual fund were valued by the Commissioner for estate tax purposes at the current "asked" price (the cost to buy a share in the public sales
market) according to Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(b) (1963). The taxpayer
urged that the current "bid" price (a figure based on net asset value at which
the fund will redeem its shares) was more appropriate in valuing the shares.
Because the "bid" price was the only market price for fund shares, the court
noted that "bid" reflected the true value of the shares, and, therefore, held
for the taxpayer.
This case conflicts with the recent decision in Ruehlmann v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969), which held that because mutual fund
shares are -analogous to insurance- and annuity contracts, they should be
ESTATE TAX VALUATION -
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valued at the asked price, a figure representing all the benefits of ownership
including the redemption rights. In contrast, the Davis court reasoned that
because mutual fund shares have no incidents of ownership which could
justify valuing them at a price in excess of their redemption price, they were
more closely analogous to corporate shares covered by a mandatory repurchase agreement, which, under Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958), are
valued at the repurchase price. The district court's analogy is precise and
should become the accepted valuation figure.
EXEMPTIONS AND DEDUCTIONS -

Green
A class of

PRIVATE SEGREGATED SCHOOLS -

v. Kennedy, 38 U.S.L.W. 2418 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 1970).-

Negro children and parents sought to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service
from granting tax benefits in the form of exemptions and deductions to
segregated private schools. The Commissioner took the view that, unless
the operation of the schools was unconstitutional by virtue of state involvement, tax benefits could not be denied the schools or their contributors. The
plaintiffs claimed that, unless a temporary injunction were granted, they
would suffer irreparable injury, even if a final decree were later rendered in
their behalf. A three-judge panel from the District Court for the District
of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction, reasoning that racial segregation in the school system was encouraged and supported by the tax benefits.
The court has extended the principle enunciated in Coffey v. State Educ.
Fin. Comm., 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969), where the court held
unconstitutional state tuition grants to Mississippi children attending private
segregated schools. Now, both direct and indirect governmental assistance
to these quasi-governmental "private" schools is proscribed.
ToRTs
DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES McKenzie v. Fairmont Food Co., 305 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1969).After defendant
removed this wrongful death action from the Common Pleas Court of Lucas
County to federal district court, the plaintiff contended that the defendant
food company was negligent when a 10-year-old boy entered upon defendant's land and inhaled gas fumes from the open and exposed gas tank of
defendant's truck. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's allegations of negligence,
the court sustained the defendant's motion under FED. R. CIr. P. 12(b) (6),
noting that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
In sustaining the defendant's motion, the court interpreted Ohio law as
rejecting application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles and reaffirmed the inapplicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine
in Ohio. Applying ordinary principles of negligence, the court noted that
the defendant property owner owed only a duty not to willfully injure the
child, and that the child's intervening act was the proximate cause of his
own death.
NEGLIGENCE -

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION -

v. Simpkins,

-

Ark. -

ASSAULTS BY COEMPLOYEES

, 448 S.W.2d 39 (1969).-

Lofland Co.
Simpkins sought

recovery under workmen's compensation for injuries sustained during normal working hours when horseplay in which he had participated culminated
in his being assaulted - after he had resumed his normal duties - by his
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protagonist, a fellow employee. The workmen's compensation commission
had disallowed recovery because, in its view, the assault had not arisen "in
the course of employment." Finding that because the employer knew that
his prohibition of such horseplay was ineffective the assault was sufficiently
related to the daimant's work to warrant recovery, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas affirmed the lower court's reversal of the commission order. Because it had previously awarded compensation for injuries resulting directly
from an assault where the employer had acquiesced in the horseplay, the
court reasoned that Simpkins should not be penalized where the employer
had given warnings against horseplay, but such warnings were known by
him to be ineffective.
Amid the divergent interpretations of what injuries are "sustained in
the course of employment," the Simpkins decision represents a most liberal
construction. Most courts have allowed recovery for assault by coemployees
only when the employer could have reasonably foreseen that the nature of
the work or the general character of the guilty employee might lead to such
an assault. Although the instant decision conforms to the trend of interpreting workmen's compensation statutes in favor of the employee, by placing upon the employer the duty to prevent horseplay, it effectively renders
him an insurer against personally motivated acts of his employees which
happen to occur on his premises.

